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Abstract 
Research on motor imagery proposes that overt actions during motor imagery can be avoided by 
proactively signaling subthreshold motor commands to the effectors and by invoking motor-
command inhibition. A recent study by Rieger, Dahm, and Koch (2017) found evidence in support of 
motor command inhibition, which indicates that MI cannot be completed on the sole basis of 
subthreshold motor commands. However, during motor imagery, participants know in advance when 
a covert response is to be made and it is thus surprising such additional motor-command inhibition is 
needed. Accordingly, the present study tested whether the demand to perform an action covertly 
can be proactively integrated by investigating the formation of task-specific action rules during motor 
imagery. These task-specific action rules relate the decision rules of a task to the mode in which 
these rules need to be applied (e.g., if smaller than 5, press the left key covertly). To this end, an 
experiment was designed in which participants had to switch between two numerical judgement 
tasks and two response modes: covert responding and overt responding.  First, we observed markers 
of motor command inhibition and replicated the findings of Rieger and colleagues. Second, we 
observed evidence suggesting that task-specific action rules are created for the overt response mode 
(e.g., if smaller than 5, press the left key). In contrast, for the covert response mode, no task-specific 
action rules are formed and decision rules do not include mode-specific information (e.g., if smaller 
than 5, left).  
Keywords: Task switching; motor imagery; inhibition 
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Motor command inhibition and the representation of response mode during motor imagery  
1. Introduction 
Motor imagery (MI) refers to a dynamic state during which the representation of a given 
motor act is internally rehearsed within working memory without any overt movement (Decety & 
Grezes, 1999, p. 177; see also Collet & Guillot, 2010; Moran et al., 2012). MI-based techniques are 
widely used for optimizing a variety of complex skills such as in athletics (see Weinberg, 2008, for a 
review), typing (Nyberg, Eriksson, Larsson, & Marklund, 2006), playing music (e.g., Highben & Palmer 
2004; Lim & Lippman, 1991), or even surgical interventions (e.g., Rogers, 2006). A key proposal of MI 
is the Motor Simulation Theory (MST) developed by Jeannerod (1994, 2001, 2006). MST is based on 
the assumption that MI includes motor representations, which are also involved in the preparation 
and initiation of actual movements (Jeannerod, 1994). This stance is evidenced by a substantial body 
of neuro-physiological research, which indicate that the neural circuitry underlying MI partially 
overlaps with the neural circuitry underlying the overt execution of actions (cf. Burianová et al., 
2013; Kraeutner, Gionfriddo, Bardouille, & Boe, 2014). In addition, mental-chronometry procedures 
have repeatedly demonstrated a functional similarity between covert and overt action, namely the 
time needed to perform a particular action covertly co-varies with the time needed to execute an 
action overtly (i.e., isochrony, see Guillot et al., 2012b, McAvinue & Robertson, 2008, for reviews). 
For instance, Decety, Jeannerod, and Prablanc (1989) observed that increasing the length of a 
particular walking distance not only increases the actual walking time but also the imagined walking 
time.  
Following MST, motor representations common to overt and covert action are activated 
through a simulation mechanism during MI (Jeannerod, 2001, 2006). Yet, whereas MI relies on the 
same representations as the overt action it simulates, the overt action (i.e., actual execution) itself is 
absent (Jeannerod, 2004, 2006). MI thus constitutes a paradox in which motor representations are 
activated, on the one hand, and overt movements are avoided, on the other hand (see Jeannerod, 
2001, p. S106; Guillot et al., 2012a, p. 2 for a similar argument). Jeannerod (2001) proposed two 
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mechanisms through which overt actions are avoided. First, motor activation during MI is subliminal, 
such that it is insufficient to instantiate overt action. Second, motor output during MI is blocked by 
an inhibitory process, which is generated in parallel with motor activation. Similarly, Guillot et al. 
(2012b) provided a review on research focusing on motor inhibition during MI and proposed that 
overt actions during MI are avoided in three complementary ways : (a) the demand to perform 
covert responses is part of the imagery experience and integrated within the construction of the 
mental representation of the imagined action, such that only subthreshold motor commands are 
signaled to the effectors; (b) motor commands specific for the effector used in the imagined 
condition are weakened by inhibitory cerebral regions, possibly complemented with cerebellar and 
spinal inhibitory influences (i.e.  effector-specific motor-command inhibition); and (c) all motor 
activity is inhibited (global motor-command inhibition).  
As pointed by Guillot et al. (2012b, p. 8), motor-command inhibition during MI shows 
parallels with a well-documented phenomenon in cognitive psychology, namely response inhibition 
in which participants are required to withhold an overt response when a specific signal is presented 
(see Verbruggen & Logan, 2008, 2009 for reviews). A common finding in research on response 
inhibition is that trials following a trial on which a response was inhibited are responded to much 
more slowly, which has been attributed to residual inhibitory processing (e.g., Rieger & Gauggel, 
1999; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2008). Based on this type of findings, Rieger 
and colleagues (2017) investigated the processes underlying MI by comparing aftereffects of overt 
and covert responding (i.e., MI). To this end, they developed a novel response-mode switching 
paradigm. A computer display presented four horizontally aligned empty circles, which corresponded 
with four horizontally aligned response keys. When a circle was filled, participants had to press the 
corresponding response key. For the two leftwards circles, the left hand had to be used. For the two 
rightwards circles, the right hand had to be used. Depending on the color of the filled circle, 
participants responded to a trial either overtly or covertly. More precisely, participants had to release 
a rest-key and press the corresponding response key overtly or covertly before returning to the rest 
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key. Such procedure provides two dependent measures, which are common to overt and covert 
responding: Release Times (the time between stimulus onset and releasing the rest-key) and Inter 
Rest-Key Intervals (the time interval between releasing the rest-key and re-entering the rest-key). In 
the condition of interest, the mode repeated or switched on a trial-by-trial basis and four trial 
sequences were created: C (covert trial n-1) – O (overt trial n) sequences; O-O sequences; O-C 
sequences and C-C sequences. Release Times were longer for C-O sequences than for O-O sequences. 
Switching from the covert to the overt mode thus elicited a mode switch cost. The difference 
between C-C and O-C sequences was not significant. Inter Rest-Key Intervals were longer for C-C 
sequences compared to O-C sequences.  A mode switch benefit was thus observed. Inter Rest-Key 
Intervals did not differ significantly between O-O and C-O sequences. Rieger et al. (2017) concluded 
that the aftereffects of MI they observed provided evidence for global motor-command inhibition. 
This inhibition persists over time and affects performance on trial n. Avoiding an overt response on 
trial n-1 impairs the motor commands involved in executing an overt response on trial n, but also the 
motor commands involved in releasing and re-entering the rest-key. Additional analyses were also 
conducted in which the repetition of specific hand movements across two trials was taken into 
account (i.e., hand repetition vs. hand alternation).  Hand repetitions were slower than hand 
alternations in the C-C and C-O sequences, whereas the reverse pattern was observed for the O-O 
sequences. Rieger et al. (2017) interpreted this pattern as evidence for the hypothesis that MI is also 
associated with effector-specific motor-command inhibition, which hampers the repetition of the 
same effector across two trials. Interestingly, Rieger et al. (2017) also compared complete repetitions 
(i.e., same hand, same stimulus) with partial repetitions (i.e., same hand, different stimulus), but did 
not observe differences between both, which led to the conclusion that MI does not involve action-
specific motor-command inhibition.  
The findings of Rieger et al. (2017) stress the importance of global and effector-specific 
motor command inhibition during MI and the specific pattern of after-effects they observed is 
difficult to reconcile with the idea that MI is solely based on subthreshold commands, without 
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invoking additional motor-command inhibition. However, this does not exclude that motor 
commands during MI may be weaker compared to actual response execution, nor that the demand 
to perform a task covertly is somehow proactively integrated with the other features of task. As 
pointed out by Guillot et al. (2012a, p. 8), when participants engage in MI they know in advance that 
only a covert movement is required and it would be puzzling that overt movements during MI can 
only be avoided through motor command inhibition. In analogy, research on response inhibition 
recently demonstrated that response inhibition also depends on preparatory processes, which 
proactively adjust the necessary attentional and response parameters in view of the future 
requirement to inhibit a response when  needed (Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016; 
Verbruggen, Stevens, & Chambers, 2014). This state of affairs raises the question to which extent the 
demand to respond covertly can be integrated proactively with the other features of an imagined 
movement, when signaled that MI ensues. In the present study, we tested this issue by investigating 
whether task-specific action rules are created during MI. These rules integrate the decision rules of a 
particular task (e.g., odd-left, even-right) with the parameters specifying the response modality in 
which these decisions rules need to be applied (e.g., saying the word left, pressing a left key; Philipp 
& Koch, 2010). The central question was if such task-specific action rules are created when signaled 
that a task needs to be performed covertly (i.e., MI), such as ‘if smaller than 5, press the left key 
covertly”. To this end, the procedure of Rieger et al. (2017) was extended to also incorporate task 
switches besides response-mode switches. 
Task switching has been widely used in order to investigate how different task parameters are 
represented and configured (see Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & 
Verbruggen, 2010, for reviews). A core observation in task switching is the task-switch cost, which 
manifests itself as higher reaction times and error rates when the task switches compared with 
repeating the same task as in trial n-1. The switch cost offers a marker of the processes involved in 
configuring the cognitive system towards a new task, which prepare for that task (e.g., Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995) and shield the cognitive system from proactive interference emanating from 
previously executed tasks (e.g., Dreisbach & Haider, 2009; see also Vandierendonck et al., 2010, for 
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an extensive review of the interplay between preparation and interference in task switching). The 
task-switch cost has been frequently used as a marker to measure how different task parameters are 
organized when performing a task (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Hübner, Futterer, & 
Steinhauser, 2001; Kleinsorge & Heuer, 1999; Phillip & Koch, 2010; Vandierendonck, Christiaens, & 
Liefooghe, 2008). These parameters can be thought of as cognitive representations of the different 
components of a task, such as the goal of that task, the stimulus-response categorization rules 
needed to achieve the task goal, the response modality, the relevant stimulus dimension, and so on. 
Previous research demonstrated that in some cases task parameters are integrated into a single 
representation underlying task performance, which is commonly labelled the task-set (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995).  Evidence for this hypothesis comes from task-switching studies in which not only 
tasks can repeat or switch, but also the relevant stimulus dimension (Vandierendonck et al., 2008) or 
the response modality (Hübner et al., 2001; Kleinsorge & Heuer, 1999; Philipp & Koch, 2010). Philipp 
and Koch (2010) used a task-switching design in which participants had to switch between two tasks 
(e.g., parity and magnitude judgments) and two overt response modalities (verbal, manual). They 
observed that the cost of switching both the response modality and the task at the same time was 
almost similar to the cost of changing the response modality (modality switching) or the task (task 
switching) separately. Such under-additive switch-pattern (i.e., cost of changing two components < 
cost of changing component 1 + cost changing component 2) indicates that response modality is 
integrated with the other task parameters into a single task-set. Whenever the response modality, 
the task, or both are changed, the entire task-set is rebuilt. Philipp and Koch (2010) proposed that in 
this situation task-specific action rules are created, which incorporate both the response modality 
and the decision rules of that task (i.e., the category-response mappings). For instance, for the 
magnitude task in the verbal modality these action rules are “if smaller than 5, say left” and “if larger 
than 5, say right”, whereas for the manual modality these action rules are “if smaller than 5, press the 
left-key” and “if larger than 5, press the right-key.” Nevertheless, task parameters are not always 
integrated into a single task-set. For instance, Hübner et al. (2001) observed that switching two task 
components led to a cost, which was almost equal to the sum of the costs associated with changing 
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each component separately. Such additive switch pattern (i.e., cost of changing two components = 
cost of changing component 1 + cost of changing component 2) indicates that each component can 
be configured separately without affecting the configuration of other components. When two 
components are changed, reconfiguration of each component occurs in a linear fashion, with each 
reconfiguration cost adding up to an overall performance cost (Vandierendonck et al., 2008).   
Based on the task-switching approach outlined in the previous paragraph, we investigated 
whether task-specific action rules are created during motor imagery, such as “if smaller than 5, press 
the right key covertly” and “if larger than 5, press the left key covertly”? To this end, we conducted an 
experiment in which participants switched between two tasks, on which they could either respond 
overtly or covertly. Each task required either a left or a right key-press. For both tasks, responses were 
only performed with the index finger of the right hand and performance was measured by using 
Release Times and Inter Rest-Key Intervals. First, we measured indices of motor-command inhibition. 
To this end, we focused on the interaction between response mode (overt, covert) and response-
mode transition (mode repetition, mode switch), as was previously done by Rieger et al. (2017). The 
presence of motor-command inhibition could be inferred by the presence of response-mode switch 
costs for the overt response mode and response-mode switch benefits for the covert response mode. 
Note that, because we only used one effector, we could not dissociate whether such pattern reflects 
global or effector-specific motor command inhibition, which was not the aim of the current study. In 
view of the results of Rieger et al. (2017), we will refer to the term global/effector-specific motor 
command inhibition in the remainder of the text. However, our procedure allowed us to further 
investigate the role of action-specific inhibition in MI.  To this end, we focused on response-repetition 
effects, which refers to the common finding that response repetitions are faster than response 
switches (e.g., Kleinsorge, 1999). Because only one effector was used in the present study (i.e., the 
right hand), response repetitions are action repetitions and response alternations are action 
switches. Following the conclusion of Rieger et al. (2017) that action-specific inhibition does not play 
a role in MI, response repetition and response alternations should be disrupted to the same extent 
following MI. Alternatively, if MI does involve action-specific inhibition, then response repetitions 
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should be disrupted to a larger extent after MI compared to response alternations, thus leading to a 
reduction or reversal of the response-repetition effect. 
Second, we investigated if task-specific action rules were created by investigating the 
interaction between response-mode transition and task transition (task repetition vs. task switch).  
For the overt response mode, the results of Philipp and Koch (2010) suggest that task-specific action 
rules are created and we expected an under-additive switch pattern, indicating that the cost of 
changing both the task of and the response mode is in the same range as changing each component 
separately. For the covert response mode, two scenarios are possible. On the one hand, the 
prospective nature of MI (Guillot et al., 2012b) and the importance of preparatory processing in 
response inhibition (Elchlepp et al., 2016; Verbruggen et al., 2014), suggest that the covert response 
mode can be integrated with other task parameters. Accordingly, a sub-additive switch pattern would 
be expected, indicating the creation of task-specific action rules in which the demand to respond 
covertly is included. On the other hand, the results of Rieger et al. (2017) indicated that MI is not 
associated with subthreshold motor commands and the possibility remains the even if participants 
are requested to perform MI, task-specific action rules are not created, thus predicting an additive 
switch pattern.  
 
2. Material and Methods 
2.1 Participants 
  A sample of 60 right-handed volunteers were recruited at Ghent University (47 females, 
mean age = 23.15 years).  All participants signed an informed consent, which was approved by the 
Ethical Committee of Ghent University. They were payed 10 euros for their participation. 
2.2 Stimuli, tasks, and apparatus 
Stimuli consisted of the digits 1-9 (excluding 5). Each numerical judgement task was cued by 
one of two different cues and cue repetitions were avoided (see Monsell & Mizon, 2006). Digits had 
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to be classified either as smaller or larger than 5, when the cue “KLEIN-GROOT” (Dutch for small-
large) or the cue “K-G” appeared above the target stimulus.  When the cue “ONEVEN-EVEN” (odd-
even) or “O-E” appeared, participants had to decide whether the number was odd or even. All tasks 
and task cues occurred with equal frequency. The covert and overt mode was also cued by using two 
cues per mode, without cue repetitions. The demand to respond overtly was indicated by either the 
cue “VOER UIT” (execute in Dutch) or “FYSIEK” (physical in Dutch). The demand to respond covertly 
was indicated by the cue “BEELD IN” (imagine in Dutch) or “MENTAAL” (mentally in Dutch). All 
variables (tasks, task transition, mode, mode transition, responses, and cues) were pseudo-
randomized across experimental subsets of four blocks. Cues and stimuli were presented in white on 
a black background one below the other, whereby the imperative stimulus was always below the 
cues. For half the subjects, the task cue appeared above the mode cue, whereas the reverse was true 
for the other half. Viewing distance was approximated 60 cm. Participants pressed a left-key (the 
“A”-key of an AZERTY keyboard) as a response to small and uneven digits and a right-key (the “P”-
key) for large and even digits. The spacebar served as start key. 
2.3 Design and Procedure  
After giving informed consent, participants were outlined the general purpose of the 
experiment, which was described as measuring the power of imagination. Next, on-screen 
instructions specified how participants had to respond overtly to both tasks (i.e., the use of the 
release key) and the task rules of both tasks. Afterwards, the instructions for the covert trials were 
provided. These instructions were virtually the same, for the exception that participants were now 
told that they should imagine responding to each task. More specifically, they were told to release 
the rest key and imagine pressing one of the two response keys without actually doing it. To 
encourage participants to engage in MI, an electrode was connected to their right index finger, which 
was attached to a bogus device. Participants were told that we were able to measure the degree to 
which they performed MI. In addition, a fake calibration phase was conducted in which the bogus 
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device was tested. All responses were made with the right index finger. The experiment was run in a 
single session that took about 60 minutes.  
For creating balanced task sequences, four factors were considered: Task Transition, Mode 
Transition, Response Transitions, and Task-Rule Congruency. Each factor contains two levels, 
resulting in 16 combinations. In order to create balanced sequences in which each combination 
follows upon another combination an equal number of times, a balanced randomization function was 
used which requires 16 x 16 + 1 = 257 trials. Three of these massive blocks were administered during 
the experiment. However, because these blocks were far too long for the participants they were 
divided in four smaller blocks. The first block contained 65 trials. The second block started with the 
presentation of the last trial of the previous block and again consisted of 65 trials. For the third and 
the fourth block the same procedure was used. Accordingly, the whole experiment consisted of 12 
blocks of 65 trials each. The first trial of each block was removed from analyses, resulting in 64 trials 
that were available for analyses (i.e., 768 in total). For the practice block, a virtual block of 257 trials 
was also created, but participants only performed the first 50 trials of that sequence. 
Each trial was initiated by participants pressing the spacebar. If the spacebar was not already 
pressed at the beginning of the trial, the request “SPATIE” (spacebar in Dutch) was presented in the 
center of the screen until pressing of the spacebar or until a maximum time of 3,000ms had elapsed. 
If the spacebar was already pressed at the beginning of the trial, this display was not presented. 
When the spacebar was pressed, a fixation cross was displayed for 1,000ms, followed by the task 
cue, mode cue, and imperative stimulus that remained visible until participants pressed the spacebar 
again to end the trial or until 3,000ms had elapsed. On the overt trials, participants were required to 
release the spacebar, press the response key and return to the spacebar. On the covert trials, the 
spacebar had to be released. After that, participants had to imagine the movement without actually 
moving the finger towards the response keys. The spacebar had to be pressed when the imagined 
movement was finished. Pressing the spacebar again terminated the trial and initiated the next one. 
At the end of each block, participants received error feedback. To simulate registration of imagined 
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movements with the bogus device, the amount of errors made on the overt trials was doubled for 
the feedback (e.g., if a participant made two errors in the overt condition, the error amount in the 
feedback was four). 
2.4 Data analysis 
Two participants had to be excluded because of not following the instructions. Based on the 
absolute deviation around the median (Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & Licata, 2013), participants with a 
median error rate above 12.74 % were excluded, which led to an additional loss of six participants1. 
The final sample consisted of 12 men and 40 women with a mean age of 23.04 years (range: 18-28). 
The practice phase was excluded from the analyses, as was the first trial of each block. In addition, 
invalid trials (in which the spacebar was not released or not pressed again, or in which a key was 
pressed that did not belong to the set of response keys, 3.4 % in total) were discarded. Of main 
interest were the Release Times and the IRKIs, which are common to overt and covert trials. For your 
guidance, a schematic illustration of both measures is also presented in Figure 1. Because error data 
was not available in the covert trials, errors were not discarded for the overt trials.  
Figure 1 about here 
Several analyses were conducted on each dependent measure. First, in order to check 
whether participants did perform MI on the covert trials, the correlation between the RT on the 
covert trials and the RT on the overt trials was calculated (see Guillot et al., 2012b for a discussion of 
this approach). Of course, one could argue that this is no evidence for participants really engaging in 
MI but instead, it could merely suggest that participants just waited the estimated amount of time 
they would need to move to the response key before going back to the spacebar and this without 
actually imagining doing this movement. To account for this possibility, we also checked whether 
response-congruency effects (Sudevan & Taylor, 1987) were present on the covert trials. Response-
congruency effects are caused by stimuli affording the same (congruent stimulus) versus different 
                                            
1 Please note that the data patterns of main interest were not changed in analyses including all participants. 
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responses (incongruent stimulus) across both tasks. Typically, incongruent stimuli are responded to 
more slowly than congruent stimuli (see Meiran & Kessler, 2008 for a review). 
In a second step, we investigated the presence of global/effector-specific motor command 
inhibition and whether the covert response mode is integrated with other task parameters. To this 
end, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with the factors Task Transition (task repetition vs. 
task switch), Mode (overt vs. covert), and Mode Transition (mode repetition vs. mode switch). All 
post-hoc comparisons were Bonferroni corrected. Third, we investigated the presence of action-
specific inhibition by focusing on response-repetition effects. For this purpose, a repeated measures 
ANOVA with the within-subjects factors Mode (overt vs. covert), Mode Transition (mode repetition 
vs. mode switch), and Response Transition (repetition vs. switch) was conducted. For these analyses, 
invalid trials not only in the current but also in the previous trial were excluded to prevent the factor 
Response Transition from being contaminated.  
In a final step, we also focused on the actual Reaction Times (i.e., the interval from the 
presentation of the imperative stimulus until pressing of a response key) and Error Rates on the overt 
trials. In line with more common research on task switching, error trials as well as post-error trials 
were discarded for the Reaction-Time analysis. Post-error trials were also discarded for the analysis 
of the Error Rates. Means and standard deviations of both measures are presented in Table 1. Both 
measures were subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Task Transition, Mode 
Transition, and Response Transition.  
Table 1 about here 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Release Times 
Means and standard errors are presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 about here 
3.1.1 Control analyses 
The correlation between covert and overt trials was significant, r = .97, p < .001, suggesting 
that participants did engage in MI on the covert trials as intended by our procedure. In addition, a 
significant congruency effect of 16ms was visible for covert responses, t (51) = 2.71, p < .01. 
3.1.2 Global/effector-specific motor command inhibition and integration of response mode 
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Task Transition (task repetition vs. task switch), 
Mode (overt vs. covert), and Mode Transition (mode repetition vs. mode switch) was conducted. 
Only the main effect of Task Transition was significant, F (1, 51) = 19.81, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .28, MSe = 
2,105. RTs were shorter for task repetitions (826ms, SE = 51ms) than for task switches (846ms, SE = 
54ms). All other effects failed to reach statistical significance (p’s > .05).  
3.1.3 Action-specific motor command inhibition 
A repeated measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors Mode (overt vs. covert), Mode 
Transition (mode repetition vs. mode switch), and Response Transition (repetition vs. switch) was 
conducted. Neither the main effect of Response Transition nor any interaction involving this factor 
was significant, all F’s < 1.4, p’s > .23. 
 
In sum, the Release Times showed a significant congruency effect for covert responses as 
well as a significant correlation of overt and covert responses, indicating that participants did engage 
in MI. However, effects involving Mode, Mode Transition, or Response Transition were not 
significant. 
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3.2 Inter rest-key intervals 
Means and standard errors of the IRKIs are presented in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 about here 
3.2.1 Control Analyses 
The correlation between overt and covert trials was significant, r = .73, p < .001. The congruency 
effect for covert responses amounted to 29ms, t (51) = 4.90, p < .001. 
3.2.2 Global/effector-specific motor command inhibition and integration of response mode 
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Task Transition (task repetition vs. task switch), 
Mode (overt vs. covert), and Mode Transition (mode repetition vs. mode switch) was conducted.  
The main effect of Task Transition was significant, F (1, 51) = 16.75, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .25, MSe = 
1,702. The mean interval length was shorter on task repetitions (1110ms, SE = 56ms) compared to 
task switches (1127ms, SE = 56ms). The main effect of Mode was also significant, F (1, 51) = 28.20, p 
< .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .36, MSe = 213,558. The mean interval length was shorter on covert trials (998ms, SE = 
65ms) than on overt trials (1239ms, SE = 55ms). The main effect of Mode Transition was not 
significant, F < 1.7, p > .20. 
The interaction between Mode and Mode Transition was significant, F (1, 51) = 25.64, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .33, MSe = 7,768. The mean interval length was significantly (p < .001) shorter on overt 
trials following upon overt trials (1213ms, SE = 53ms) compared to overt trials following upon covert 
trials (1265ms, SE = 58). In other words, C-O sequences were slower than O-O sequences.  In 
contrast, the mean interval length on covert trials following upon overt trials was significantly (p < 
.001) shorter (981ms, SE = 63ms) compared to the mean interval length on covert trials following 
upon covert trials (1016ms, SE = 67ms). O-C sequences were thus faster than C-C sequences. 
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The three-way interaction between Task Transition, Mode, and Mode Transition was 
significant, F (1, 51) = 7.14 p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .12, MSe = 1,322. IRKIs were analyzed for both modes 
separately. For the overt trials, the main effect of Task Transition was significant, F (1, 51) = 12.44 p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .20, MSe = 2,093. IRKIs were shorter for task repetitions (1228ms, SE = 78ms) than for task 
switches (1250ms, SE = 78ms). The main effect of Mode Transition was also significant, F (1, 51) = 
29.07, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .36, MSe = 4,813. The mean interval length was shorter on mode repetitions 
(1213ms, SE = 74ms) than on mode switches (1265ms, SE = 82ms). The interaction between Task 
Transition and Mode Transition was significant, F (1, 51) = 5.31 p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .09, MSe = 1,815. 
Switching the task alone elicited a switch cost of 36ms. Switching only the mode went along with a 
cost of 66ms, whereas switching both task and mode resulted in a cost of 74ms (i.e., under-
additivity). 
For the covert trials, the main effect of Task Transition was significant, F (1, 51) = 4.32 p < .05, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, MSe = 1,386. IRKIs were shorter for task repetitions (993ms, SE = 91ms) than for task 
switches (1004ms, SE = 94ms). The main effect of Mode Transition was also significant, F (1, 51) = 
9.31, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .15, MSe = 7,100. The mean interval length was shorter on mode switches (981ms, 
SE = 90ms) than on mode repetitions (1016ms, SE = 95ms). The interaction between Task Transition 
and Mode Transition was not significant for covert responses, F ≈ 1, p > .31. On a descriptive level, 
pure task switches went along with a cost of 5ms, whereas pure mode switches elicited a benefit of 
42ms. Switching both task and mode went along with a benefit of 25ms. 
3.2.3 Action-specific motor command inhibition 
A repeated measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors Mode (overt vs. covert), Mode 
Transition (mode repetition vs. mode switch), and Response Transition (repetition vs. switch) was 
conducted.  
The interaction of Response Transition and Mode Transition was significant, F (1, 51) = 4.03, 
p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, MSe = 1320. Whereas after overt trials a response repetition benefit of 11ms 
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occurred, this was not the case after covert trials (-4ms). In addition, the three-way interaction 
between Response Transition, Mode Transition and Mode was significant, F (1, 51) = 6.79, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .12, MSe = 2138 (Figure 4). To further analyze this interaction, separate ANOVAs were run for both 
modes. For the overt mode, the interaction was significant, F (1, 51) = 10.46, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .17, MSe = 
1790. Whereas for C-O sequences, response repetition costs of 18ms were visible, a response 
repetition benefit of 20ms occurred for O-O sequences. For the covert mode, the interaction 
between Mode Transition and Response Transition was not significant, F < 1, p > .86.  
Figure 4 about here 
 
In sum, a significant congruency effect for covert trials was visible in IRKIs, as was a 
significant correlation of covert and overt trials, indicating again that participants did engage in MI. 
Furthermore, the IRKIs indicated a mode switch cost for the overt mode and a mode switch benefit 
for the covert mode, indicating that performing responses covertly goes along with motor inhibition. 
Regarding the question whether the different response modes are integrated into a single task-set, a 
sub-additive pattern of switching response mode and task was observed for overt responses, 
suggesting that the overt response mode can be integrated with other task parameters into a single 
task-set. For the covert trials, an additive pattern of switching response mode and task was obtained, 
indicating that the covert response mode was not integrated into the task-set. Finally, a response-
repetition cost was observed after covert responses, pointing towards the presence of action-specific 
motor command inhibition.2 
                                            
2 In addition, ANOVAs including the factors Task Transition, Mode, Mode Transition, and Response Transition 
were run. A significant three-way interaction of Task Transition, Mode Transition, and Response Transition was 
visible for the Inter Rest-Key Intervals, F (1, 51) = 5.89, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .10, Mse = 3,144: A response repetition 
benefit of 29ms was observed for the task repetition/mode repetition condition, whereas in the other 
conditions, response repetition effects (benefits as well as costs) were not significant. This can be interpreted in 
line with the hybrid account proposed by Koch, Frings, and Schuch (2017). However, due to the additional Task 
Transition Factor, the number of observations per cell dropped by 50%. As a consequence, the statistical power 
necessary to find the three-way interaction of Mode, Mode Transition, and Response Transition was lost. 
Because this analysis is important for the main findings of the present study, and in the light of the many 
analyses already included, the four-way ANOVA is not included in the main body. 
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3.3 Additional measures on overt trials 
Means and standard errors for reaction times and error rates of overt trials are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 about here 
 
3.3.1 Reaction Times 
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Task Transition (task repetition vs. task switch), 
Mode Transition (mode repetition vs. mode switch), and Response Transition (response repetition vs. 
response switch) was conducted. A main effect of Task Transition could be observed, F (1, 51) = 
52.52, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .51, MSe = 4,723, indicating longer Reaction Times on task switches (1728ms, SE 
= 35ms) compared to task repetitions (1680ms, SE = 33ms). The main effect of Mode Transition was 
also significant, F (1, 51) = 20.88, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 29, Mse = 8,571: mode repetitions went along with 
faster Reaction Times (1683ms, SE = 33ms) compared to mode switches (1725ms, SE = 34ms). Both 
factors interacted, F (1, 51) = 15.84, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .24, Mse = 5,638.  This effect was due to complete 
repetitions (1644ms, SE = 32ms) being significantly (p’s < .001) faster than all other conditions 
(1722ms, SE = 36ms, for pure task switches, 1715ms, SE = 35ms, for pure mode switches, and 
1734ms, SE = 34ms, for double switches), while no other pairwise comparison reached statistical 
significance (p’s > .39). This pattern is clearly under-additive, the cost of double switches being 59ms 
smaller than the sum of both types of single switches. 
Regarding effects of action-specific motor command inhibition, the interaction of Mode 
Transition and Response Transition was significant, F (1, 51) = 8.28, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .14, Mse = 4,737. For 
mode repetitions, a response repetition benefit of 20ms occurred. For mode switches, on the 
contrary, a response repetition cost of 19ms occurred. The interaction of Task Transition and 
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Response Transition was marginally significant, F (1, 51) = 3.82, p < .06, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, Mse = 4,740, 
indicating he usual effect of a response repetition benefit (13ms) for task repetitions and a response 
repetition cost for task switches (13ms). 
3.3.2 Error Rates  
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors Task Transition (task repetition vs. task switch), 
Mode Transition (mode repetition vs. mode switch), and Response Transition (response repetition vs. 
response switch) was conducted. A significant error switch cost of 0.4 % occurred, F (1, 51) = 4.07, p < 
.05, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.07, Mse = 0.00034. Task Transition and Mode Transition interacted, F (1, 51) = 7.97, p < .01, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .14, Mse = 0.00032. Switching the task alone led to a significant cost of 0.9% (p < .01). Switching 
the mode alone led to a significant cost of 0.8% (p < .05). The cost of switching both the task and the 
mode amounted to 0.7% and was marginally significant (p < .06). 
Regarding action-specific motor command inhibition, none of the effects involving the 
Response Transition factor reached significance, all F’s < 2.4, all p’s >.13. 
 
4. Discussion 
Previous research by Rieger et al. (2017) offered evidence for the presence of global and 
effector-specific motor command inhibition during MI. Nevertheless, during MI participants know in 
advance that MI will ensue. In addition, recent findings indicate that (response) inhibition also 
includes preparatory activity (Elchlepp et al., 2016; Verbruggen et al., 2014). Accordingly, we 
investigated whether the demand to perform covert responses can be proactively integrated with 
other task parameters during MI and, more specifically, whether task-specific action rules are 
created during MI.  To this end, we used a task-switching procedure, which required participants to 
switch between two choice-reaction tasks as well as two response modes (overt, covert).  
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In a first step, we tested for the presence of indices of motor command inhibition during MI. 
We observed a response-mode switch cost for the overt response mode (C-O > O-O) and a response-
mode switch benefit for the covert response mode (O-C < C-C). In line with Rieger et al. (2017), we 
thus conclude that when MI is required on trial n-1, motor-command inhibition takes place that 
persists over time and affects performance on trial n. In contrast, no such inhibition is triggered 
during overt responding. As noted in the Introduction, the same effector was used during our 
experiment. Accordingly, we could not dissociate between global- or effector-specific motor-
command inhibition. Yet, our design enabled us to dissociate between response repetitions and 
response alternations. Because only one effector was used response repetitions were thus action 
repetitions, whereas responses alternations were action switches. A response-repetition benefit 
could be observed for O-O sequences of the Inter Rest-Key Intervals that turned into a cost as soon 
as the trial sequence involved a covert trial. This finding indicates the presence of action-specific 
motor command inhibition during MI and is at odds with the findings of Rieger et al. (2017). We 
discuss this and another notable difference later on. 
In a second step, we investigated the creation of task-specific action rules, which integrate 
decision and response-mode parameters. For the overt trials, the cost of changing the task or the 
response mode alone was in the same range as the cost of changing both components 
simultaneously. Such under-additive pattern of findings replicates the results of Philipp and Koch 
(2010) and suggests that the overt response mode can be integrated with other task parameters into 
a single task-set (see also Vandierendonck et al., 2008). In other words, task-specific action rules 
were created, which combined response mode and task rules (e.g., “if smaller than 5, press the left-
key). For the covert trials, changing the task led to a performance cost and changing the response 
mode led to a performance benefit. However, both types of transitions did not affect each other. In 
other words, an additive pattern was observed, which suggests that response-mode switching and 
task switching occurred independently and that for the covert response mode no task-specific action 
rules were created.  
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The present results suggest that overt and covert responding are underlain by different 
processes. For the overt response mode, task-specific action rules are created, which incorporate 
both response-mode information and task-rule information (e.g., “if smaller than 5, press the left-key 
overtly”). In contrast, for the covert response mode, no mode specific information seems to be 
integrated. In other words, task-specific action rules such as “if smaller than 5, press the left-key 
covertly” are not created when participants are cued to perform a task covertly via MI. The presence 
of a task-switch cost and a response-congruency effect on the covert trials, however, indicates that 
when a task is performed covertly, its corresponding decision rules are activated. Accordingly, when 
participants are cued to perform a particular task covertly, two processes are triggered in parallel. 
First, task-rules are configured, which do not contain response-mode specific information (e.g., “if 
smaller than 5, left”). Second, motor command inhibition is invoked, which avoids the overt 
execution of a response.  
Regarding the observation that task-specific action rules are restricted to the overt response 
mode, a possible explanation may be that the integration of mode-specific and task-specific 
information only serves the overt execution of a response. More specifically, task-specific action 
rules may be created in order to prepare the cognitive system for an optimal overt application of a 
task. In contrast, during MI a task needs to be simulated and overt execution avoided. Creating task-
specific action rules, which include actions that can be performed overtly (e.g., press a left key) 
together with the connotation that these actions should in fact not be performed overtly, may not be 
an optimal strategy during MI. Within this view, task-specific action rules are thus not constructed 
during MI in order to avoid overt responses. Alternatively, it could be that it is simply not possible – 
or at least in the present context – to create task-specific action rules for covert actions. Indeed, 
previous research by Philipp, Jolicoeur, Falkenstein, and Koch (2007) suggested that overt response 
execution is needed to further integrate all elements of a task-set and thus create task-specific action 
rules3. These authors manipulated the timing of the onset of a go or no-go signal in a task-switching 
                                            
3 We thank Iring Koch for directing our attention to this possibility. 
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paradigm in which participants were not allowed to respond until a go-signal was presented. They 
found that increasing the delay of the signal, thus providing more time for response preparation, 
facilitates performance strongly if the trial turns out to be a go trial, but if it turned out to be a no-go 
trial, no after-effects of task-specific response preparation could be found, even though participants 
must have prepared the task and the response to the same degree in both conditions, because the 
nature of the signal (i.e., go vs. no-go) was not predictable. These findings suggest that some of the 
relevant bindings that create persistent aftereffects require actual response execution and not only 
preparation to execute.  Accordingly, the present results show that even covertly responding to a 
stimulus is not sufficient to integrate all elements of task-set and create task-specific action rules. 
This conclusion is also in line with recent research on the creation of task-sets on the mere basis of 
instructions (see Brass, Liefooghe, Braem, & De Houwer, 2017; Meiran, Liefooghe, & De Houwer, 
2017).  Whereas initial task-sets can be formed on the basis of instructions (e.g., Liefooghe, Wenke, 
& De Houwer, 2012; Meiran et al., 2015), these task-sets do not integrate all instructed information 
and practice is needed to incorporate these additional instructions (see Braem et al., 2017 for a 
demonstration in the domain of context-specific automaticity). Taken together, the present results 
corroborate with previous findings and indicate that overt task execution has an added value in 
shaping task-set representations, which can possibly not be obtained on the basis of MI (see also 
Theeuwes et al., in press for a similar conclusion).  
There are two notable differences between the present findings and the results of Rieger et 
al. (2017), which need to be discussed. First, as mentioned earlier on, we did obtain evidence for 
action-specific motor inhibition, whereas this was not the case in the study of Rieger et al. (2017). 
One possible explanation for this difference is based on the response-discrimination account of 
Ansorge and Wühr (2004; see also Hommel, 2009). This account states that actions are discriminated 
by using the perceptual effects that distinguish between these actions. In the present study, only one 
effector (the right hand) was used and the salient discriminative feature was a movement to either 
the left-sided or to the right-sided response. Motor command inhibition could thus have operated at 
the level of this salient feature, leading to action-specific motor command inhibition. The specific 
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response display used in the present study could in addition have inflated action-specific motor 
command inhibition on the basis of spatial positive and negative response priming. In the study of 
Rieger and colleagues (2017), two effectors (the left and the right hand) were used. Accordingly, in 
the study of Rieger et al. (2017) participants had to discriminate between two response hands and 
two possible actions within each hand. Possibly, in this case the discrimination between hands was 
more salient than the discrimination between specific actions within each hand. Accordingly, motor 
command inhibition became effector specific rather than action specific. Taken together, the 
difference in results between both studies may suggest that motor command inhibition is bound to 
the most salient discriminative feature in a task.  
A second main difference between the present study and the study of Rieger et al. (2017) is 
that, in the present study, IRKIs were generally faster for covert than for overt responses, whereas 
the opposite pattern was observed in the study of Rieger et al. (2017). At a first glance, this could be 
taken as evidence that participants in the present study did not engage in MI as thoroughly as in the 
study of Rieger et al. (2017), especially since the general MI ability of participants was not assessed 
with MI questionnaires. The reason for this is that no valid MI questionnaires are available in Dutch. 
Besides, it should be noted that no correlation between behavioral data and MI questionnaires have 
been expected, which is due to the fact that MI ability seems to be highly dependent on the specific 
movement to be imagined (Rieger, personal communication, 24.07.2017). As a consequence, no 
correlation between the movements in the present experiment (i.e., keystrokes) and movements 
typically included in MI questionnaires (e.g., walking or cycling) was assumed.  However, the 
correlations between overt and covert movements were extremely high and we furthermore 
observed a task-rule congruency effect on the covert trials. Both findings thus indicate that 
participants did engage in MI as we intended. Furthermore, IRKIs on the covert trials of the present 
study were one average 998ms and on average 933ms in the study of Rieger et al. (2017). In contrast, 
for the overt trials IRKIs were on average 1239ms in the present study and 627ms in the study of 
Rieger et al. (2017). The difference between both studies thus mainly resides in a difference in 
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performance on the overt trials. One possible interpretation for this difference is that in the present 
study participants had to switch between two sets of arbitrary category-to-response mappings (e.g., 
odd -> left), whereas in the study of Rieger et al. (2017) participants performed only one task, in 
which they had to apply spatially compatible stimulus-response mappings (e.g., outer left circle -> 
outer left response). Our tasks may thus have been much more difficult for participants to perform 
overtly compared to the task used by Rieger and colleagues. This difference in performance between 
both studies may then have been levelled out on the covert trials. Alternatively, it is also possible 
that observing similar IRKIs on the covert trials of both studies is a coincidence. Within this view, the 
possibility arises that the spatially compatible stimulus-response mappings used by Rieger et al. 
(2017) induced additional inhibition on the covert trials. It is reasonable to assume that applying 
spatially compatible stimulus-response mappings is to a large degree automatic. As such, during MI 
the automatic tendency to respond needs to be additionally suppressed, which can lead to a general 
increase in response time. Such automaticity did not come into play in the present study, as the tasks 
were much more arbitrary.  
To conclude, we need to consider the present results in light of the MST (Jeannerod, 1994, 
2001, 2006). Our findings indicate that even if participants know in advance that a covert response is 
needed, they do not create task-specific action rules for MI. This could indicate that the demand to 
perform an action covertly is not part of the imagery experience and thus not integrated within the 
construction of the mental representation of the imagined action (cfr. Guillot et al., 2012a). The 
observation of markers of motor-command inhibition, may furthermore lead to the conclusion that 
motor-commands in MI are not subthreshold in nature. However, some nuance is needed. First, if 
the covert response mode is not integrated with the other task parameters, what mental 
representation is responsible for triggering motor-command inhibition? Research underlying the 
importance of proactive control in response inhibition (e.g., Elchlepp et al., 2016; Verbruggen et al., 
2014), indicates that besides response parameters also attentional parameters are adapted to 
prepare for the eventual inhibition of a response. Accordingly, the present results do not exclude 
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that the demand to respond covertly is represented at a different level than the decision rules of a 
task. Second, the observation of motor-command inhibition does not undermine the hypothesis that 
overt responses during MI can also be avoided by means of subthreshold signals. In the current 
context it seems that overt responses are mainly avoided by means of motor-command inhibition. 
The demand to frequently switch between response modalities, however, may have increased the 
need for motor-command inhibition and somewhat overshadowed the role of subthreshold signals. 
In other words, the pathway by which overt actions are avoided in MI, may depend on the specific 
task context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflict of interest: 
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. 
 
Ethical Standards: 
The present study was performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down the Declaration 
of Helsinki and approved by the Ethical Committee of Ghent University. 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. References 
Allport, A., Styles, E. A., & Hsieh, S. (1994). Shifting intentional set: Exploring the dynamic 
control of tasks. In C. Umilta & M. Moscovitch (Eds.), Conscious and nonconscious information 
processing: Attention and performance XV (S. 421-452). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Ansorge, U., & Wühr, P. (2004). A response-discrimination account of the Simon effect. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 30(2), 365–377. 
27 
 
Burianová, H., Marstaller, L., Sowman, P., Tesan, G., Rich, A. N., Williams, M., Savage, G., & 
Johnson, B. W. (2013). Multimodal functional imaging of motor imagery using a novel paradigm. 
NeuroImage, 71, 50–58. DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.01.001. 
Decety, J., & Grèzes, J. (1999). Neural mechanisms subserving the perception of human 
actions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3(5), 172–178. 
Decety, J., Jeannerod, M., & Prablanc, C. (1989). The timing of mentally represented actions. 
Behavioural Brain Research, 34(1), 35–42. 
Dreisbach, G., & Haider, H. (2009). How task representations guide attention: further 
evidence for the shielding function of task sets. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 35(2), 477–486. 
Elchlepp, H., Lavric, A., Chambers, C. D., & Verbruggen, F. (2016). Proactive inhibitory control: 
A general biasing account. Cognitive Psychology, 86, 27–61. 
Guillot, A., & Collet, C. (Eds.). (2010). The neurophysiological foundations of mental and 
motor imagery. Oxford University Press. 
Guillot, A., Di Rienzo, F., MacIntyre, T., Moran, A., & Collet, C. (2012a). Imagining is not doing 
but involves specific motor commands: A review of experimental data related to motor inhibition. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6, 247. 
Guillot, A., Hoyek, N., Louis, M., & Collet, C. (2012b). Understanding the timing of motor 
imagery: Recent findings and future directions. International Review of Sport and Exercise 
Psychology, 5, 3–22. DOI: 10.1080/1750984X.2011.623787. 
Highben, Z., & Palmer, C. (2004). Effects of auditory and motor mental practice in memorized 
piano performance. Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education, 58–65. 
28 
 
Hommel, B. (2009). Action control according to TEC (theory of event coding). Psychological 
Research, 73, 512–526. 
Hübner, R., Futterer, T., & Steinhauser, M. (2001). On attentional control as a source of 
residual shift costs: Evidence from two-component task shifts. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27(3), 640–653. 
Jeannerod, M. (1994). The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and 
imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17(2), 187–202. 
Jeannerod, M. (2001). Neural simulation of action: A unifying mechanism for motor control. 
NeuroImage, 14, S103–S109. 
Jeannerod, M. (2004). Actions from within. International Journal of Sport and Exercise 
Psychology, 2(4), 376–402. 
Jeannerod, M. (2006). Motor cognition: What actions tell the self (No. 42). Oxford University 
Press. 
Kiesel, A., Steinhauser, M., Wendt, M., Falkenstein, M., Jost, K., Philipp, A. M., & Koch, I. 
(2010). Control and interference in task switching – a review. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 849–874. 
Kleinsorge, T. (1999). Response repetition benefits and costs. Acta Psychologica, 103(3), 295–
310. 
Kleinsorge, T., & Heuer, H. (1999). Hierarchical switching in a multi-dimensional task space. 
Psychological Research, 62(4), 300–312. 
Koch, I., Frings, C., & Schuch, S. (2017). Explaining response-repetition effects in task 
switching: Evidence from switching cue modality suggests episodic binding and response inhibition. 
Psychological Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-017-0847-9. 
29 
 
Kraeutner, S., Gionfriddo, A., Bardouille, T., & Boe, S. (2014). Motor imagery-based brain 
activity parallels that of motor execution: Evidence from magnetic source imaging of cortical 
oscillations. Brain Research, 1588, 81–91.  DOI: 10.1016/j.brainres.2014.09.001. 
Leys, C., Ley, C., Klein, O., Bernard, P., & Licata, L. (2013). Detecting outliers: Do not use 
standard deviation around the mean, use absolute deviation around the median. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 49, 764–766. DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2013.03.013. 
Lim, S., & Lippman, L. G. (1991). Mental practice and memorization of piano music. The 
Journal of General Psychology, 118(1), 21–30. 
McAvinue, L. P., & Robertson, I. H. (2008). Measuring motor imagery ability: a review. 
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 20(2), 232–251. 
Meiran, N., & Kessler, Y. (2008). The task rule congruency effect in task switching reflects 
activated long-term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 34, 137–157. DOI: 10.1037/0096-1523.34.1.137. 
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(3), 134–140. 
Monsell, S., & Mizon, G. A. (2006). Can the task-cuing paradigm measure an endogenous 
task-set reconfiguration process? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 32, 493–516. DOI: 10.1037/0096-1523.32.3.493. 
Moran, A., Guillot, A., MacIntyre, T., & Collet, C. (2012). Re‐imagining motor imagery: 
Building bridges between cognitive neuroscience and sport psychology. British Journal of Psychology, 
103(2), 224–247. 
Nyberg, L., Eriksson, J., Larsson, A., & Marklund, P. (2006). Learning by doing versus learning 
by thinking: an fMRI study of motor and mental training. Neuropsychologia, 44(5), 711–717. 
30 
 
Philipp, A. M., Jolicoeur, P., Falkenstein, M., & Koch, I. (2007). Response selection and 
response execution in task switching: Evidence from a go-signal paradigm. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33(6), 1062–1075. 
Philipp, A. M., & Koch, I. (2010). The integration of task-set components into cognitive task 
representations. Psychologica Belgica, 50(3-4), 838–411. 
Rieger, M., Dahm, S. F., & Koch, I. (2017). Inhibition in motor imagery: A novel action mode 
switching paradigm. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(2), 459–466. 
Rieger, M., & Gauggel, S. (1999). Inhibitory after‐effects in the stop signal paradigm. British 
Journal of Psychology, 90(4), 509–518. 
Rogers, R. G. (2006). Mental practice and acquisition of motor skills: examples from sports 
training and surgical education. Obstetrics and Gynecology Clinics of North America, 33(2), 297–304. 
Rogers, R. D., & Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a predictable switch between simple cognitive 
tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124, 207–231. 
Sudevan, P., & Taylor, D. A. (1987). The cueing and priming of cognitive operations. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 13, 89–103. DOI: 10.1037/0096-
1523.13.1.89. 
Vandierendonck, A., Christiaens, E., & Liefooghe, B. (2008). On the representation of task 
information in task switching: Evidence from task and dimension switching. Memory & Cognition, 
36(7), 1248–1261. 
Vandierendonck, A., Liefooghe, B., & Verbruggen, F. (2010). Task switching: interplay of 
reconfiguration and interference control. Psychological Bulletin, 136(4), 601–626. 
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2008). Response inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(11), 418–424. 
31 
 
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2009). Models of response inhibition in the stop-signal and 
stop-change paradigms. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 33(5), 647–661. 
Verbruggen, F., Logan, G. D., Liefooghe, B., & Vandierendonck, A. (2008). Short-term 
aftereffects of response inhibition: Repetition priming or between-trial control adjustments? Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 34(2), 413–426. 
Verbruggen, F., Stevens, T., & Chambers, C. D. (2014). Proactive and reactive stopping when 
distracted: An attentional account. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 40(4), 1295–1300. 
Weinberg, R. (2008). Does imagery work? Effects on performance and mental skills. Journal 
of Imagery Research in Sport and Physical Activity, 3(1), 1–21. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Mode Repetition Mode Switch  
  Response 
Repetition 
Response 
Switch 
Response 
Repetition 
Response 
Switch 
M 
Reaction 
Times 
Task Repetition 1629 (33) 1660 (32) 1717 (35) 1713 (35) 1680 (33) 
Task Switch 1718 (35) 1726 (38) 1752 (35) 1717 (35) 1728 (35) 
M 1673 (33) 1693 (35) 1734 (34) 1715 (35)  
       
Error 
Rates 
Task Repetition 0.8 (0.2) 0.9 (0.2) 2.0 (0.4) 1.4 (0.3) 1.3 (0.1) 
Task Switch 1.6 (0.3) 1.9 (0.4) 1.6 (0.4) 1.6 (0.3) 1.7 (0.2) 
M 1.2 (0.2) 1.4 (0.3) 1.8 (0.2) 1.5 (0.2)  
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Table 1. Mean reaction times [ms] and error rates [%] of overt trials as a function of Task 
Transition, Mode Transition, and Response Transition. SEM are given in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Captions: 
Figure 1. Overview of the procedure of single trials. 
Figure 2. Mean Release Timess [ms] as a function of Mode (Overt vs. Covert), Mode Transition (Mode 
Repetition vs. Mode Switch), and Task Transition (Task Repetition vs. Task Switch). Error bars 
represent SEM.  
Figure 3. Mean Inter Rest-Key Intervals [ms] as a function of Mode (Overt vs. Covert), Mode 
Transition (Mode Repetition vs. Mode Switch), and Task Transition (Task Repetition vs. Task Switch). 
Error bars represent SEM.  
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Figure 4. Mean Inter Rest-Key Intervals [ms] as a function of Mode (Overt vs. Covert), Mode 
Transition (Mode Repetition vs. Mode Switch), and Response Transition (Response Repetition vs. 
Response Switch). Error bars represent SEM. 
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